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Abstract. Almost all human infections by avian inﬂuenza viruses (AIVs) are transmitted from poultry. A systematic
review was conducted to identify practices associated with human infections, their prevalence, and rationale. Ob-
servational studies were identiﬁed through database searches. Meta-analysis produced combined odds ratio esti-
mates. The prevalence of practices and rationales for their adoptions were reported. Of the 48,217 records initially
identiﬁed, 65 articles were included. Direct and indirect exposures to poultry were associated with infection for all
investigated viral subtypes and settings. For themost frequently reported practices, association with infection seemed
stronger in markets than households, for sick and dead than healthy poultry, and for H7N9 than H5N1. Practices were
often described in general terms and their frequency and intensity of contact were not provided. The prevalence of
practiceswas highly variable across studies, and no studies comprehensively explored reasons behind the adoption of
practices. Combining epidemiological and targeted anthropological studies would increase the spectrum and detail of
practices that could be investigated and should aim to provide insights into the rationale(s) for their existence. A better
understanding of these rationales may help to design more realistic and acceptable preventive public health measures
and messages.
INTRODUCTION
All four of the inﬂuenza virus strains that resulted in pan-
demics in the last century have had an avian origin. While the
1918–1919 H1N1 pandemic strain was entirely derived from
an avian virus,1 the subsequent pandemic strains of H2N2 in
1957, H3N2 in 1968, and H1N1 in 2009 all acquired gene
segments from avian viruses by reassortment.2,3 Within the
last 20 years, a variety of avian inﬂuenza virus (AIV) subtypes
affecting domestic poultry—especially H5N1, H7N9, and
H9N2—has resulted in human infections in mainly Asia and
Egypt.4–6 Although these zoonotic transfers are sporadic and
their transmission is not sustained within human populations,
they also show a potential for reassortment with human viru-
ses7; a very few nucleotide substitutions in some circulating
strains might allow them to be transmissible between hu-
mans.8 It is widely feared that ongoing circulation of zoonotic
AIVs within poultry populations and their transfer to humans
could result in emergence of a novel human pandemic strain.
Asalmost all humancases result fromexposure topoultry or to
environments contaminated by poultry,9–11 mitigation mea-
sures intended to prevent zoonotic infections and reduce the
risk of adaptation of these viruses to human hosts must be
carefully targeted, not only toward the poultry populations
sustaining these viruses12 but also toward practices exposing
people to infected poultry and contaminated environments.
Mitigation measures have to take into account the complexity
and difﬁculty of behavior change strategies and techniques,
recognizing that “behavior” should not be construed as ex-
clusively “individual” but as located within a socioeconomic
and cultural milieu.
This study presents a systematic review of the scien-
tiﬁc literature relating to practices exposing humans to
AIVs in Asia and Egypt. The objectives of the review are to
identify poultry exposure practices associated with hu-
man infection, describe their prevalence within human
populations, and examine the rationales for their persis-
tence. This review is informed by insights from social
anthropology. It recognizes that the analytical category
“practice(s)” as deployed in the literature reviewed largely
ignores the social, economic, and cultural context(s)
and the subjective meanings of such “practices” for the
“practitioners.”
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Search strategy and selection criteria. This systematic
review adheres to PRISMA guidelines (see checklist in Sup-
plemental Material).13 A database search of MEDLINE, Sci-
ence Citation Index, Social Science Citation Index, and The
Zoological Record was conducted during the period October
10, 2014, to January 12, 2015. The search used the Boolean
search criteria “A AND B”, as follows:
A: “avian inﬂuenza”OR “avian ﬂu”OR “bird ﬂu”OR “inﬂuenza
A” OR “H5N1” OR “H7N7” OR “H7N9” OR “H9N2” and
B: “animal-human”OR “backyard farms”OR “biosecurity”OR
“chicken farms” OR “commercial farms” OR “cultural
practices”OR “disease transmission”OR “duck farms”OR
“exposure” OR “face masks” OR “farms” OR “gloves” OR
“human exposure” OR “human infection” OR “live bird
markets” OR “live poultry markets” OR “market practices”
OR “markets” OR “occupational exposure” OR “poultry
farms” OR “prevention” OR “risk” OR “risk + exposure” OR
“risk behavior”OR “risk practices”OR “seroconversion”OR
“seroprevalence” OR “transmission.”
The “Title”, “Keywords,” and “Abstract” ﬁelds were
selected in all databases, except for the MEDLINE database
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which offered to search “All Fields.” EndNote was used to
manage citations and remove duplicates.
Eligible articles had to be published between January 1,
1997, and December 31, 2014. This review start date was
chosen because the ﬁrst H5N1 human case was reported
during that year.14 Articles had to either assess 1) the as-
sociation between poultry exposure practices and clinical or
asymptomatic infection by AIVs (hereafter referred to as risk
factor studies) or 2) the prevalence of these practices in
human populations (hereafter referred as practice preva-
lence studies). The poultry exposure practices under con-
sideration had to result in physical contact with poultry or
contact with environments potentially contaminated by
poultry. Human infections with AIVs could be either clinical
cases that were laboratory conﬁrmed or seropositive, asymp-
tomatic individuals. If the association between a practice and
human infection was assessed, a measure of effect had to be
reported.
Practice prevalence studies included studies assessing
proportions of individuals adopting deﬁned practices in a
given population, as well as studies only mentioning the
presence or absence of deﬁned practices in the study pop-
ulation. For both study types, searches were restricted to
English-language publications and studies based in Asia and
Egypt, where the subtypes currently causing most human
cases (H5N1, H9N2, and H7N9) are endemic.4–6 In addition,
we assessed all studies identiﬁed in the initial search if they
explored the reasons why people adopt practices, which may
promote human exposure to avian inﬂuenza, whether they
gave quantitative information on risk factors for infection or
prevalence of practices.
Screening of titles and abstracts was carried out by one
reviewer and checked by a second to remove studies unlikely
to contain relevant information. Where exclusion could not be
justiﬁed by one reviewer based solely on screening of a re-
cord’s title and abstract, the full text was retrieved to allow
both reviewers to reach a consensus.
Data analysis. The quality of included risk factor studies
was assessed using an adaptation of the Cochrane Risk of
Bias Tool.15 Risk of bias was assessed for the following
domains: bias due to confounding, bias in the selection of
participants into the study, bias in measurement of expo-
sures, bias due to missing data and bias in measurement of
outcome. Based on these domain-level assessments, the
overall risk of bias of each study was assessed as low,
moderate, serious, or critical (Supplemental Text 1, Sup-
plemental Table 1). The quality of the practice prevalence
studies was based on the rigor of the sampling strategy and
the representativeness of the ﬁndings either at the province
or country level. To be classiﬁed as Quality 1, participants
had to be recruited using random sampling at the provincial
(ﬁrst administrative division) or national level. If sampling
was not random (e.g., purposive and convenience) and/or
the study was conducted at the level of a district (second
administrative division) or lower, the study was classiﬁed as
Quality 2.
For all studies, the following variables were extracted:
study period, location, study design, study population,
sample size, setting (household, live bird market [LBM], and
farm). For risk factor studies, the following variables were
also extracted: case deﬁnitions, poultry exposure practices
measured, and their associated non-adjusted and adjusted
measure of association with outcomes (e.g., odds ratio
[OR]) along with their 95% conﬁdence interval (CI) and
P value. For practices that were investigated in two or more
studies, we examined heterogeneity between studies using
the I2 statistic,16 and computed overall OR estimates using
the random-effect model of DerSimonian and Laird.17 As
adjusted ORs were not reported in all studies, ORs that
were not adjusted for other exposures were used as model
inputs. A sensitivity analysis was conducted by differen-
tiating studies according to their risk of bias and locations
(Supplemental Text 2, Supplemental Tables 2 and 3).
For the practice prevalence studies, we focused on those
practices identiﬁed a priori to be associated with human
infection. For each practice, the proportion of people or
households adopting it was extracted, along with the as-
sociated 95% CI. When the CI of a proportion was not
mentioned in a paper, the binomial proportion CI (also re-
ferred to as the exact method) was calculated. These prac-
tices included raising poultry at home, keeping birds inside
the house, visiting LBMs, touching poultry during purchase,
handling (touching, selling, throwing, and incinerating) or
eating sick or dead poultry, slaughtering poultry, and using
personal protective equipment (PPE). We did not aim to
compute overall estimates for the prevalence of each prac-
tice, but rather to describe variations in prevalence esti-
mates for given practices across settings and studies. The
range and median of reported prevalences and I2 statistic
were reported. If some practice prevalence studies explored
reasons why people adopted some of the practices of in-
terest based on responses to interviews and observations,
these rationales were extracted. Data were extracted by a
ﬁrst reviewer and then checked for missing data and
inaccuracies by a second reviewer. A sensitivity analysis
was conducted by differentiating studies according to
their geographical location and their quality score (Supple-
mental Text 2, Supplemental Tables 4 and 5).
All analyses were run using R 3.2.218 and the package
“metafor”.19
Roles of the funding source. The funders of the study had
no role in study design, data collection, data analysis, data
interpretation, or writing of the report. The corresponding
author had full access to all the data in the study and had ﬁnal
responsibility for the decision to submit for publication.
RESULTS
Study selection and characteristics. In total, 547 full texts
were screened. Of these, 65 articles were included in the
systematic review (Figure 1). Some articles reported multiple
studies conducted in different countries over different years,
targeting different populations (e.g., households and market
workers) or focusing ondifferent virus subtypes, andexploring
both the presence of risk factors and the prevalence of prac-
tices. They were considered as separate studies. Twenty-
three articles incorporated 24 risk factor studies (Table 1) and
46 articles presented 51 practice prevalence studies (Sup-
plemental Table 8).
Twenty of the 24 risk factor studies investigated either
H5N1 (N = 11) or H7N9 (N = 9) infections. Three studies
detected H9 and one detected H7. Cases were deﬁned as
patients with a clinically apparent infection—as opposed to
asymptomatic infection—in half of H5N1 studies and in all
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but one H7N9 studies. Most studies had either a case–
control (N=10) or a cross-sectional (N=8) studydesign. Four
out of the ﬁve ecological studies focused onH7N9, and there
was only one cohort study. Half of the H5N1 studies and all
H7N9 studies were conducted in China (including Hong
Kong). Other study sites were Cambodia, Egypt, Indonesia,
Pakistan, Thailand, and Vietnam. Six studies focused on
workers in commercial poultry farms (as opposed to house-
hold ﬂocks), markets, and/or abattoirs. The other 18 studies
recruited participants from the general or rural populations. The
numberof cases in the10case–control studies ranged from7 to
89, with a median of 27. In seven of the eight cross-sectional
studies, the prevalence of infection was lower than 6%. The
quality assessment of these studies is detailed in Supplemental
text 1. Ten studies were assessed as being at moderate risk of
bias and 14 at serious risk of bias.
All 51 practice prevalence studies were cross-sectional and
conducted in 14 countries, mostly in southeast Asia (N = 25,
49%) and China (N = 11, 22%, including Hong Kong). Thirty-
six studies explored poultry exposure practices in house-
holds, whereas practices adopted by poultry market, farm,
and/or abattoir workers were explored in 15 studies. All but
three studies explored practices using standardized ques-
tionnaires. The remaining three studies, conducted in Ban-
gladesh, used observations and in-depth interviews. Sample
sizes were highly variable, ranging from 34 to 4950, with a
median of 312. We classiﬁed 21 studies as Quality 1 and 30
studies as Quality 2 (Supplemental Table 8).
Association between poultry exposure practices and
AIV infection.Study-speciﬁcandpooledORs for eachpoultry
exposure practice explored in the included case–control, co-
hort, and cross-sectional studies are shown in Figures 2–5
(detailed exposures in Supplemental Table 12).
Indirect exposure. Indirect exposure to poultry was gen-
erally expressed as the co-occurrence of poultry and study
participants in a given environment: within the neighborhood,
at home, in a LBM, or at the worksite. Poultry could be de-
scribed as healthy, sick, or dead. The evidence for an asso-
ciation between infection and presence of poultry in backyard
or commercial farms in the vicinity of study participants’
homes was variable across studies (Figure 2). Meta-analysis
results suggested that the presence of poultry at home sub-
stantially increased the odds of infection by H5N1 (pooled
OR = 3, 95% CI = 1.7–5.5) and H7N9 (pooled OR = 3.6, 95%
CI = 1.4–8.9). Heterogeneity was, however, large among
H7N9 studies (I2 = 69%). Odds of infectionwere even further
increased if poultry raised at home became sick or died
(H5N1, pooled OR = 9.5, 95% CI = 5.1–17.8).
Occupational exposure to poultry was explored in only three
studies, of which two suggested an association with human
infection.21,26 Visits to LBMs were associated with infection in
all studies reporting suchexposure. ThepooledORestimate for
H7N9 infection was 5.2 (95% CI = 3.6–7.3) and for H5N1 3.5
(95% CI = 1.7–7). These results were in agreement with eco-
logical study ﬁndings (Supplemental Table 6). H5N1 infection
in Indonesia was associated with the occurrence of poultry
outbreaks in the same area (RR = 1.3, 95% CI = 1.1–17).24
Two studies found an association between H7N9 cases and
the density of LBMs,36,37 whereas two others noted a drastic
reduction in H7N9 incidence with LBM closure.35,38
Increase in the odds of infection with the proximity between
poultry and humans, the size of the susceptible poultry pop-
ulation, and the frequency of exposure was further suggested
through the exploration of additional variables (Supplemental
Table 7). Keeping poultry cages inside rather than outside the
home21 and raising larger backyard28 andcommercial29ﬂocks
with suboptimal vaccination coverage21 increased the oddsof
infection.
In three studies, ORs were shown to increase with the
frequency of visits to LBMs.21,31,34 The effect of occupa-
tional exposure was found to further vary with premise type:
breeder and layer farms were at higher risk for their
FIGURE 1. Flow of selected studies.
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employees than other farm types in two studies,40,41 whereas
working in retail markets was riskier than inwholesalemarkets
and farms in another study.26
Regarding poultry species, there was weak evidence in
one study that the OR of H5N1 infection was higher when
raising waterfowl at home than when raising chickens
only.21 In one study, exposure to geese and turkeys, re-
spectively, increased the odds of H5N1 infection, whereas
exposure to ducks increased the odds of H9 infection.30
However, the odds of H9 infection were not different as
between duck and chicken keepers in another study42
(Supplemental Table 7).
Only seven out of the 19 case–control, cohort, and cross-
sectional studies described speciﬁc activities leading to
indirect exposures. Most studies found weak evidence of
association between infection and poultry husbandry-
related activities (Figure 3). Feeding poultry in farms, wit-
nessing poultry slaughter in markets, and storing products
from sick/dead poultry at homewere found to be associated
with H5N1 infection, each of them in one study. Some in-
vestigated activities were unrelated to poultry management
but to contact with water potentially contaminated by
poultry. Although pooled OR estimates revealed weak evi-
dence of an association between H5N1 infection and the
use of outdoor water (pooled OR = 2.5, 95% CI = 0.5–12.1),
the evidence was stronger for bathing in water bodies
(pooled OR = 3.1, 95% CI = 1.5–6.4).
Direct exposure. As with indirect exposure, direct expo-
sure to poultry was often described in general terms as di-
rect contact with, touching or handling poultry. Meta-analysis
suggested an association between handling poultry and in-
fection (Figure 4). Heterogeneity was high among studies
and could not only be explained by the diversity of set-
tings, as the level of heterogeneity was not reduced when
only considering households (Supplemental Table 3).
This association seemed slightly stronger for H7N9
(pooled OR = 5.5, 95% CI = 2.3–13.1) than H5N1 (pooled
OR = 2.8, 95%CI = 1.1–7.4), and when sick or dead poultry
were concerned (H5N1, pooled OR = 4.8, 95% CI =
1.2–19.2). However, handling poultry did not seem to re-
sult in higher odds of infection than indirect exposure at
home or in markets.
The investigated activities resulting in direct exposure to
poultry were related to poultry husbandry, processing, and
consumption (Figure 4). While consumption of healthy-
appearing or sick poultry was not associated with H5N1 or
H7N9 infection, several stages of poultry processing—such
as slaughtering, evisceration, and preparation—were found in
the meta-analysis to increase the odds of H5N1 infection.
Regarding poultry husbandry practices, vaccinating and
handling birds to place them into cages were found associ-
ated with H9 and H5N1 infection in two different studies. Al-
though a study found weak evidence for higher odds of H9
infection among chicken butchers than keepers (OR = 3.4,
95% CI: 0.8–14.5),42 the small number of studies for each
processing and husbandry activity, and the often high level of
heterogeneity among them limit the comparisons that can be
performed across activities, viral subtypes and poultry health
status.
Protective factors. Regarding hygiene practices (Figure 5),
meta-analysis provided weak evidence for frequent hand-
washing being a protective factor (H5N1 pooled OR = 0.5,
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95% CI = 0.2–1.3; H7N9 pooled OR = 0.2, 95% CI = 0–1.2).
Only one study examined use of masks and frequent disin-
fection of worksites (e.g., farms). It noted a reduced odds of
infection (ORs = 0.1, 95% CI = 0–1 and ORs = 0.1, 95% CI =
0–0.6, respectively).41
Prevalence of poultry exposure practices. Exposure to
live birds was widespread in studied populations (detailed
prevalences in Supplemental Table 9). Although the pro-
portion of households raising backyard poultry was higher in
rural than in peri-urban and urban areas, purchasing live poultry
in markets was more frequent in peri-urban and urban rather
than rural settings (Table 2, Supplemental Figures 1 and 2).
Levels of contact with poultry at markets and households
greatly varied across studies: the proportion of households
keeping poultry inside their own house ranged from1% to 87%
(Table 2), and the proportion of households slaughtering birds
at home ranged from 12% to 85% (Table 3, Supplemental
Figure 3). Theproportion of respondentswho reported touching
poultrywhenpurchasing it inmarketswas lower than18%in the
three surveys conducted in Hong Kong, whereas it was
FIGURE 2. Association between human AIV infection and indirect exposure to poultry in various locations. HH = Household; NS = not speciﬁed;
Prem = premises, include farms, markets and abattoirs; non-adj OR= odds ratio is not adjusted for other exposure practices; adj OR = odds ratio is
adjusted for other exposure practices; not reported = multivariate analysis was conducted but adjusted OR was not reported for the practice of
interest. This ﬁgure appears in color at www.ajtmh.org.
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higher than 58% in ﬁve of six surveys conducted in mainland
China, Viet Nam, and Thailand (Supplemental Figure 2).
The surveyed populations were highly heterogeneous in
terms of their management of sick and dead poultry
(Table 3). In Bangladesh, Egypt and, to a lesser extent,
Cambodia, the proportion of survey participants burying or
incinerating dead poultry was generally lower and the
proportion consuming, selling, or throwing sick or dead
poultry into open spaces was generally higher when
compared with other study sites (including China, India,
Indonesia, Lao, Thailand, and Viet Nam) (Supplemental
Figure 4).
The proportion of household survey participants report-
ing handwashing with soap after contact with poultry was
higher than 80% in all studies exploring this practice, ex-
cept in one study in Bangladesh where the proportion
dropped to 4%. The adoption of PPE was higher among
farm and market workers than in households. However,
most workers generally reported not wearing PPE (Sup-
plemental Figure 5).
Some additional practices were reported by only a cou-
ple of studies, including practices exposing humans to
potentially contaminated environments. This included
cleaning places where poultry are kept, bathing in water
bodies in Cambodia, washing carcasses in water bodies in
Cambodia and Bangladesh, and barefoot contact with
blood in Bangladesh.
Rationale for poultry exposure practices. None of the
reviewed studies sought to explore the rationales behind
practices at risk of human exposure to AIVs. Eight practice
prevalence studies did address some of the reasons for con-
ducting some practices, but not comprehensively (Supple-
mental Table 10). Other studies discussed these rationales as
post hoc hypotheses (Supplemental Table 11). However,
exploring rationales requires targeted research and in none of
the papers were these dealt with according to the canons of
social anthropology and ethnography.
The eight prevalence studies, in which reasons for some
practices were brieﬂy discussed, took place in Bangladesh,
Egypt, Indonesia, Lao, and Turkey. In Bangladesh, back-
yard farmers reported keeping poultry in their bedroom
because they are concerned about predation and thieves.43
Some kept sick poultry in their bedroom to separate them
from their healthy poultry and to keep them under
FIGURE 3. Association between human AIV infection and practices resulting in indirect exposure. HH = household; NS = not speciﬁed; Prem =
premises, include farms,markets andabattoirs; non-adjOR=odds ratio is not adjusted for other exposure practices; adj OR=odds ratio is adjusted
for other exposure practices; not reported =multivariate analysis was conducted but adjustedORwas not reported for the practice of interest. This
ﬁgure appears in color at www.ajtmh.org.
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observation.44 This practice was related to the perception
that people are not at risk of illness. Some people may have
been aware of avian inﬂuenza, but they considered the risks
associated with poultry handling as negligible. Moreover,
several practices were described by the authors as amatter
of preference, rooted in tradition (based on interviews of
residents or developed as post hoc hypotheses).45 For in-
stance, live poultry bought in markets were preferred to
chilled or frozen meat for consumption as the latter was
considered to be of lower quality.46 Poultry slaughtered
immediately before cooking were traditionally believed to
be fresher, more ﬂavorsome and nutritious, and less likely to
be contaminated.47 Likewise, reasons for touching poultry
before buying were related to consumer traditions, relying
on their own judgment of the quality and safety of the poul-
try.47 Authors also related the adoption of certain risky prac-
tices to poverty. High poultry prices meant that purchasing
poultry meat was not affordable for the poorest, and thereby
encouraged the consumption of sick or dead poultry.44,47,48
The non-adoption of preventive measures was mainly
explained by authors by ﬁnancial constraints, such as imple-
mentation costs and potential impact onbusiness, absence of
supporting legislation, time and space constraints, and “risk
fatigue” from repeated outbreaks.45,49–52 This is generally
analyzed in the context of poor populations that do not con-
sider avian inﬂuenza to be amajor health threat, and for whom
the perceived chance of an adverse outcome from poultry
exposure is considered to be relatively low compared with the
adverse outcome of worsening poverty.
Heterogeneity in practices across settings was often
explained by authors by differing religious beliefs. In Bangla-
desh, sick poultry were slaughtered and consumed if it was
thought that they were about to die because of religious bans
on eating animals that die of natural causes.44,48 In contrast,
consumption of dead poultry was reported in non-Muslim
populations. According to Buddhist principles, killing is con-
sidered to have karmic consequences. Thai people were
therefore considered to be less likely to slaughter poultry
themselves.47
DISCUSSION
Both direct and indirect exposures to poultry in house-
holds, farms, or markets were associated with human infec-
tion by AIVs in most of the reviewed risk factor studies. The
strength of this association seemed stronger for H7N9 than
for H5N1, for sick and dead compared with healthy poultry,
and in markets compared with any other setting. Several
studies also suggested that the odds of infection further
increased with the proximity between humans and poultry,
the size of the poultry population to which humans were
exposed, and the frequency of exposure. Direct exposure
was not associated with higher odds of infection than
indirect exposure. This apparent association between AIV
infection and indirect exposure to poultry, and the possible
role of handwashing and environmental disinfection as pro-
tective factors suggest that contacts with contaminated
environments followed by ingestion, intranasal or conjuncti-
val self-inoculation of the virus may be a major mode of AIV
transmission. Infected poultry shed a high viral load, which
may survive in the environment for a few days under favor-
able conditions.53 In households, virus survival in the envi-
ronment may represent an infection pressure to which
people may have prolonged contact, in particular when
poultry are kept inside home, including in bedrooms. Even
when environmental exposure is of a shorter duration, such
as in the case of people visiting markets, the frequent intro-
duction of infected poultry in markets and the associated
FIGURE 4. Association between humanAIV infection and practices
resulting in direct exposure. HH = household; NS = not speciﬁed;
Prem=premises, include farms,markets and abattoirs; non-adjOR=
odds ratio is not adjusted for other exposurepractices; adj OR=odds
ratio is adjusted for other exposure practices; not reported = multi-
variate analysiswas conducted but adjustedORwas not reported for
the practice of interest. This ﬁgure appears in color at www.ajtmh.
org.
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viral circulation among marketed poultry54 means that
humans may be exposed to high virus loads. However, high
uncertainty remains regarding the actual modes of trans-
mission involved. Contributions of aerosols and large drop-
lets cannot be ruled out, as investigated exposures may be
associated with several modes of transmission.55 H5N1
was shown to be transmitted between poultry by aero-
sols.56 Some practices, such as mechanical defeathering,
may generate contaminated aerosols and large droplets,
and result in the infection of people visiting markets.57
These results suggest that interventions aiming to reduce
virus load in markets,58 and behavioral change strategies
leading to higher biosafety standards when handling poul-
try, especially sick or dead specimens, could substantially
reduce human exposure to AIVs. The adoption of risky and
protective practices varied greatly across studies, and was
frequently explained as motivated by ﬁnancial constraints
and religious beliefs. These variations could also result from
temporal changes in people’s perception of their risk of
infection. As these factors were expected to vary across
the heterogeneous socioeconomic and cultural landscape
covered by the reviewed articles, risk mitigation interven-
tions should be tailored to these local contexts. However,
none of the studies reviewed here aimed to assess the
rationale behind practices at risk of human exposure to
AIVs. Reviewed knowledge, attitude, and practice studies
investigated questions related to awareness and knowl-
edge, and a few studies did touch on some reasons behind
speciﬁc practices and discussed these as post hoc hypoth-
eses, but neither in sufﬁcient detail nor at the appropriate
level of conceptualization.
LIMITATIONS
Our review was exposed to recall bias, as exposures were
captured in all risk factor studies, and most practice preva-
lence studies, through structured interviews of study partici-
pants, or proxies when study participants have died. Bias in
the measurement of exposures was more pronounced in risk
factor studies using serology to deﬁne prevalent cases: AIVs
being endemic in most settings, there was uncertainty about
whether the reported exposures preceded, or not, the in-
fection. However, this bias might be limited as most in-
vestigated exposures were daily, routine practices, which
might not greatly change in the medium-term in AIV-endemic
settings.
The use of structured interviews to measure exposure in
all risk factor studies and most practice prevalence studies
implied further limitations. Although the observed heteroge-
neity in the prevalence of practices was generally explained,
as mentioned earlier, by variations in socioeconomic and
cultural landscapes, this pattern could also result from the
FIGURE 5. Association between human AIV infection and preventive practices. HH = household; NS = not speciﬁed; Prem = premises, include
farms,markets andabattoirs; non-adjOR=odds ratio is not adjusted for other exposurepractices; adjOR=odds ratio is adjusted for other exposure
practices; not reported = multivariate analysis was conducted but adjusted OR was not reported for the practice of interest. This ﬁgure appears in
color at www.ajtmh.org.
TABLE 2
Prevalence of practices related to backyard poultry rearing and purchase of poultry in LBMs
All households Urban households Peri-urban households Rural households
n (c) p (range) I2 n (c) p (range) I2 n (c) p (range) I2 n (c) p (range) I2
Raise backyard poultry 24 (10) 65 (19–96) 99 4 (3) 45 (19–51) 98 3 (2) 50 (34–55) 91 15 (9) 78 (50–96) 98
Keep poultry inside house 6 (4) 20 (1–87) 100
Visit LBMs to purchase poultry 11 (4) 38 (7–81) 100 3 (1) 38 (33–81) 100 1 (1) 77 – 3 (1) 8 (7–9) 0
Touch when purchasing 9 (4) 59 (5–92) 100
LBM = live bird market; n (c) = number of studies along with the number of countries in which these studies took place in brackets; p (range) = median prevalence (%) and range.
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limited representativeness induced by the geographically
small study sites, and response bias. Asking about past
behavior or about practices that may be ofﬁcially banned or
enforced by regulation, or of which their adoption may be
positively or negatively perceived by people may in addi-
tion result in biased answers, leading to an underestima-
tion of the real levels of exposure. For instance, high
compliance to handwashing was reported in all question-
naire surveys that investigated this practice, but it was
only actually done by a small proportion of participants
observed in one study.48 Moreover, structured question-
naire surveys can only investigate the adoption of prac-
tices of which the study designers have an awareness.
For instance, several practice prevalence studies explored
whether participants wear boots dedicated to the care
of poultry. Based on observations of poultry rearing by
Bangladeshi rural communities, one study was able to
identify that people stepped barefoot into poultry blood.43
Stepping barefoot in poultry blood might be a more relevant
practice than the failure to wear special boots dedicated to
poultry care.
The pooled OR estimates often relied on a small number
of heterogeneous studies, and, therefore, need to be inter-
preted with caution. Also, terms used to refer to practices
were often only merely named or brieﬂy described. The
same term could have different uses, and therefore, differ-
ent meanings across studies. Multiple speciﬁc practices
may have been encompassed within these descriptions.
Only a few speciﬁc practices were investigated, but the
frequency and intensity of contact were not detailed,
preventing further discrimination of practices according to
the degree of exposure to poultry. Overall, investigated
practices—or their descriptions in the literature which are
not the same as the practices themselves—appear not to
have changed signiﬁcantly within the last 17 years. Investi-
gations have yet to be comprehensive, in-depth analyses of
given and related practices. For example, while visiting live
bird markets was found to be a risk factor for AIV infection
in the ﬁrst risk factor study in 1997, subsequent studies
were rarely able to explore in more detail which types of
practices within markets could lead to infection, given the
retrospective nature of outbreak investigations.
FUTURE RESEARCH
To address these limitations, epidemiological surveys
could beneﬁt from being combined with anthropological
investigations. Anthropological studiesmay help to identify
practices that would be better described with observations
and in-depth interviews to develop a more accurate and
detailed understanding. Such practices may, for instance,
include handwashing and the use of PPEs. Moreover, the
development of structured interview protocols would
greatly beneﬁt from a prior anthropological exploration of
both the conceptualization of “practices” and of practices
of interest. Whether “practices” are of interest may alter in
the light ofmore detailed description and contextualization.
Practices that are not systematically investigated, but
whichmay reveal to be of epidemiological importance, may
thus be characterized. Further description of practices
could include a characterization of the contacts involved,
and a measure of their intensity and frequency. The more
detailed and grounded into the local contexts these de-
scriptions are, the less comparable they may be across
settings characterized by heterogeneous populations. On
the other hand, themore general these descriptions are, the
less likely it would be possible to tailor interventions to the
local contexts that shape those practices. Detailed de-
scriptions are required to identify the most relevant prac-
tices and populations at risk that should be targeted by risk
mitigation strategies. Nevertheless, the small number of
cases identiﬁed in most risk factor studies may limit the
exploration of the association between AIV infection and
speciﬁc, detailed practices. If these practices were only
adopted by a small fraction of the population, the statistical
power would be low, and even if the actual association with
AIV infection was strong, the measured strength of asso-
ciation would be uncertain.
Epidemiological studies typically investigate the most
signiﬁcant causal relationships between practices and the
TABLE 3
Prevalence of preventive practices and practices related to the slaughtering and processing of poultry, and the management of sick and dead
poultry
Households Premises Farms Live bird markets
n (c) p (range) I2 n (c) p (range) I2 n (c) p (range) I2 n (c) p (range) I2
Slaughtering and processing poultry 11 (7) 45 (12–85) 99 2 (2) 22 (6–38) 98 4 (4) 73 (39–100) 98
Management of sick and dead poultry
Touching 9 (3) 33 (14–75) 99 2 (1) 11 (8–13) 86 1 (1) 41 –
Consumption 13 (6) 12 (2–100) 99 1 (1) 16 –
Selling 7 (6) 26 (0–100) 99 1 (1) 81 – 2 (2) 28 (2–53) 99
Returning to suppliers 1 (1) 50 – 1 (1) 9 –
Throwing in open spaces 11 (7) 45 (2–87) 99 1 (1) 20 –
Burying/Incinerating 13 (8) 72 (2–95) 99 2 (2) 62 (30–95) 99
Preventive practices
Washing hands with soap after contacts
with poultry
6 (4) 97 (4–99) 96 1 (1) 68 –
Wearing gloves 3 (3) 2 (1–2) 0 2 (1) 51 (47–54) 81 4 (4) 18 (1–30) 90 1 (1) 60 –
Wearing facemask 4 (3) 2 (0–2) 0 2 (1) 44 (42–46) 37 4 (4) 21 (6–66) 98 4 (4) 18 (13–45) 93
Wearing aprons/changing clothes 2 (2) 3 (0–5) 0 1 (1) 89 – 3 (3) 4 (3–34) 94 4 (2) 42 (15–80) 96
Wearing boots 1 (1) 6 – 3 (3) 15 (7–16) 6 4 (2) 60 (30–80) 92
Rinsing/washing equipment after use 2 (2) 66 (33–99) 98 1 (1) 41 – 4 (1) 50 (19–100) 97
n (c) = number of studies along with the number of countries in which these studies took place in brackets; p (range) = median prevalence (%) and range. Premises include farms, markets, and
abattoirs.
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human exposure to AIVs as part of outbreak investigations
and interventions to control them. Although causal rela-
tionships are difﬁcult to identify, they nevertheless seek to
achieve this by examining associations between an expo-
sure variable and a health outcome.59,60 However, identi-
fying the speciﬁc practices promoting AIV transmission to
humans is often not enough to improve preventive public
health interventions and messages. For these messages to
be heard and strategies to be adhered to by populations at
risk, their design needs to be informed by a thorough un-
derstanding of the factors and theories inﬂuencing persis-
tence of risky or preventive practices. Of use in such
investigations is the rationale behind certain risky practices
for exposure to disease: Why do people do what they do?
Under which circumstances do they engage in risky prac-
tices? At what point do practices become habitual behavior
as opposed to a conscious decision in light of the level of
risk of pathogen transmission? How do these practices
relate to the tradition, culture, and socioeconomic circum-
stances? How are these practices inﬂuenced by disease
awareness and knowledge? These questions were not part
of the main objectives of reviewed studies. Contextual re-
search appeared to be merely a by-product. As mentioned
earlier, practices and their rationales were often only brieﬂy
described. These “descriptions” may on closer examina-
tion, and informed by ethnographic studies, turn out to have
been dealing in homogenizing “labels” rather than in “het-
erogenizing” “descriptions.” This is important because
terms such as “fresh,” “nutritious,” “quality,” and “whole-
some”, are each supported by an implicit local “theory” of
these things, their importance and signiﬁcance. Un-
derstanding these theorieswould help to tailor interventions
to local circumstances (which may vary within countries),
increasing their acceptance in populations at risk. A chal-
lenge to achieve this is to access the relation between
individual actions and the socioeconomic and cultural
environment in which those actions are situated and pro-
duced. Recent theoretical61,62 and empirical works explored
the use of emergent properties, such as “hope” or “disgust,”
as quantitative variables capturing people’s experiences of
the social, economic, and cultural world they inhabit. In
Uganda, the level of hope that a person experienced was
measured and found to be associated with some known risk
factors for HIV infection.63 In India, disgust was associated
with handwashing behavior.64 Applying this approach may
provide new insights about practice adoption and inform the
development of preventive public health messages. Such
messages would aim to alter the level of a given emergent
property (e.g., “hope” and “disgust”) in the targeted pop-
ulation to promote the uptake of protective practices.
In conclusion, the descriptions of practices exposing
humans to poultry and their shared environment are often
general and with little information to aid understanding of
underlying rationales, limiting their usefulness for develop-
ing effective control and preventive measures. The assess-
ment of the prevalence of reported practices in populations
at risk was also prone to biases acting to underestimate
the actual level of exposure. Epidemiological surveys
aiming to explore potentially infectious contacts at the
human–animal interface would greatly beneﬁt from being
combined with anthropological investigations. Such an
approach would not only allow a more accurate identiﬁcation
and detailed description of risky as well as preventive prac-
tices, but would also allow the exploration of the reasons
behind these practices. This would in turn facilitate the de-
velopment of preventive public health measures and mes-
sages more likely to lead to positive behavior change in
targeted populations.
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